Reformulating the conceptualization of marketing in the context of public leisure services

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The authors deconstructed the prevailing conceptualization of public leisure marketing and concluded it rests on three principles: voluntary exchange, an open system organization, and self-interest motivation. A review of the genesis of these principles revealed that alternative principles were ignored. These were analysed and a panel of eight experts was interviewed to solicit their views on the relative merit of the prevailing and alternative principles. Based on an analysis of the alternative assumptions and the panel's input, a revised conceptualization of public leisure marketing was suggested which incorporated the principles of redistribution, the features of a closed-system organization, and public interest motivation. A revised definition of public leisure services marketing is offered based on these principles.

Introduction

Although the concept of public sector marketing (Kotler, 1972, 1975) has been widely embraced by marketing academics (Nickels, 1974; Lovelock and Weinberg, 1978), many scholars and managers in the public administration field remain skeptical. Their skepticism was articulated by the commentator who observed that ‘marketing in the public sector has a love-hate evaluation’ (Roberto, 1991, p. 81). Similar ambivalence has been expressed in the leisure literature (Havitz, 1988; Schultz et al., 1988) and in related fields (O’Fairch-ellaigh et al., 1991; Buchanan et al., 1994; Walsh, 1994; Vanden et al., 1995). Skeptics of the appropriateness of the marketing concept in the leisure field argue that its application distorts a public leisure agency’s objectives, is antithetical to its social service ethic, and invites inappropriate commercialization of its services (Goodale, 1985; Schultz et al., 1988; Godbey, 1991; Dustin and Goodale, 1997).

The intent of this paper is to deconstruct the prevailing conceptualization of public leisure marketing into a set of underlying principles; contrast these principles with alternative principles; and use the alternative principles as a basis for developing a superior conceptualization of public leisure marketing. To pursue these objectives the study employed a critical hermeneutic approach which focused on deconstruction, understanding, and interpretation (Bleicher, 1980).
Genesis of the prevailing conceptualization of marketing in the USA

The earliest conceptualizations of public leisure marketing in the US literature emerged in articles written by Crompton (1977, 1981a, 1981b, 1983a, 1983b). In 1980, the concept of marketing as a philosophical orientation and as a set of activities was introduced to a much wider audience in the leisure field in a widely adopted textbook (Howard and Crompton, 1980). Leisure marketing received a further substantial impetus from the launching of the peer reviewed *Journal of Park and Recreation Administration* in 1983 by the Academy of Park and Recreation Administration. This journal quickly emerged as the leading North American outlet for reporting studies concerned with such leisure marketing topics as analyses of leisure market potential (Howard and Crompton, 1984; Howard, 1985), market research, visitor behaviour, and market segmentation (Crompton, 1983b; Havitz and Fridgen, 1985; Warnick and Howard, 1985; Cato and Kunstler, 1988), and the application of marketing evaluation and audit techniques (Guadagnolo, 1985; Crompton and Lamb, 1986b; Howard and Selin, 1987).

With the emergence of services marketing theory in the late 1980s, the focus of studies in the leisure field in the US shifted toward the conceptualization and measurement of service quality (Toy *et al*., 1989; Crompton and Love, 1995). As a result of these developments, professionals and students in the leisure field now have access to several texts which specifically address leisure marketing (Howard and Crompton, 1980; National Park Service, 1983; O’Sullivan, 1991, 1998; Torkildsen, 1991; Leadley, 1992).

Crompton (1983a, p. 7) defined leisure marketing as: ‘a set of activities aimed at facilitating and expediting exchanges with target markets’. This definition was also adopted by the National Park Service (1983). O’Sullivan (1991, p. 1) borrowed Kotler’s (1975a) broader definition of marketing as ‘human activity directed towards satisfying needs and wants through exchange processes’. Perhaps the most comprehensive definition of marketing in the context of leisure was that suggested by Howard and Crompton because it included marketing management aspects:

Marketing is the analysis, planning, implementation, and control of carefully formulated programmes designed to bring about voluntary exchanges with target markets for the purpose of achieving agency objectives. It relies heavily upon designing offerings consistent with clients’ wants, and on using effective pricing, communication and distribution to inform, motivate, and service the markets. (Howard and Crompton, 1980, p. 320)

This conceptualization consciously or unconsciously was borrowed from pioneering works on this subject by the *social exchange school of marketing* (Sheth *et al*., 1988) which: (1) advocated a broadened conceptualization of marketing beyond the traditional notion that its utility was limited to contexts involving the commercial sale of products; (2) recognized only minimal differences between private and public sector management; and (3) argued for the universality of marketing applications (Kotler and Levy, 1969; Kotler and Zaltman, 1971; Kotler, 1972; Bagozzi, 1975). The academic
traditions of this social exchange school stemmed from the conservative traditions of the Chicago school of economics which advocates the *laissez-faire*, libertarian paradigm. Most textbooks on public leisure marketing have consciously or unconsciously derived their principles from this school's conceptualization of public sector marketing (Howard and Crompton, 1980; National Park Service, 1983; Torkildsen, 1991; O’Sullivan, 1991, 1998; Leadley, 1992).

Principles of the prevailing conceptualization of marketing

Representatives of the social exchange school believe that public sector managers should be interested in ‘understanding what the [public] organization exchanges with each public; i.e., what each party gives and gets . . . [and what are] . . . the motivations underlying their transactions and satisfactions received’ (Kotler, 1975, p. 17). Three major principles underlie the school’s conceptualization of public sector marketing: (1) an open-system model of formal organizations, borrowed from organizational theory (Katz and Kahn, 1966); (2) the concept of social exchange, adapted from sociology (Homans, 1961); and (3) self-interest motivation, advocated by ‘formalist’ economic anthropologists (Belshaw, 1965). These principles and their origins are discussed in the following sub-sections.

Open-system model of organizations

The social exchange school assumes that an organization is ‘a purposeful coalescence of people, materials, and facilities seeking to accomplish some purpose in the outside world’ (Kotler, 1975, p. 5). The primary functions of such an organization are: (1) input – attraction of sufficient resources; (2) throughput – conversion of these resources into various products; and (3) output – distribution of these throughputs to the public. This conceptualization of a formal organization as a resource conversion machine, is consistent with the precepts of an open-system model of organizations, designed to respond to external and internal pressures.

The open-system model of formal organizations views a leisure agency as being at the centre of a system that responds directly and quickly to the needs of an array of different publics. It assumes that the leisure agency has sufficient independence to enable it to respond quickly to changes in the environment in which it operates. The open-system model encourages decentralized decision-making, because success is perceived to depend on being able to respond quickly and adapt to dynamic external and internal pressures. Managers are not pre-occupied with following pre-established goals. Emphasis is placed on attracting additional resources from the external environment beyond those regularly provided by the agency’s governing body; to convert these resources into leisure programmes and services; and to efficiently distribute these services. The leisure agency is assumed to be the primary decision-maker, free of a requirement to constantly refer actions for authorization to a higher authority.
Self-interest motivation

The social exchange school of marketing contends that pursuit of personal self-interest is the essential motivation for exchange between formal organizations and their publics. Although Kotler (1975) avoided the term ‘self-interest’, Bagozzi (1975, p. 34), who acknowledged Kotler’s influence and advice, openly recognized the central role of self-interest motivation in the context of public sector marketing: ‘... many individuals, groups, and firms pursue their own self-interest. This is what Adam Smith meant by his reference to an “invisible hand” ... the pursuit of self-interest can be the foundation for the web of kinship, economic, and social institutions’. Smith (1850, p. 7) described the *quid pro quo* principle that underlies his philosophy of the invisible hand in the following terms: ‘whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this: give me that what I want, and you shall have this which you want’. Shapiro (1973, p. 124) similarly believed that this central role of self-interest in the context of non-profit marketing was sufficiently self-evident that there was no need to discuss it: ‘I shall not bother discussing the concept of self-interest; it can be taken for granted’.

Voluntary exchange

A central tenet of the social exchange school is that all organizations seek to attain their goals through the voluntary exchange mechanism. They perceive voluntary exchange to be the only viable mechanism through which formal organizations can attract, convert, and distribute resources (Kotler, 1975).

Kotler argues that voluntary exchanges are not limited to such conventional resources as ‘goods, services, and money ... [but] include other resources such as time, energy, and feelings’ (Kotler, 1972, p. 49). He believes that voluntary exchange in all of its resource forms should be conceptualized as a transaction, and that it is the central tenet underpinning the notion that marketing is generic. Such exchanges require the existence of at least two conditions: (1) the availability of two parties, and (2) that each party possesses some resource that is valued by another party (Kotler, 1975, p. 23).

Overview of alternative principles

A major limitation of the theoretical position of both the social exchange school of marketing and the Chicago school of economics, is that they use a reductionist methodology (Etzioni, 1988; Moniesson, 1988). Moniesson (1988), borrowing from Max Weber (1946) characterized this approach as intellectualization, which he defined as a ‘reductio ad absurdum’ approach in which the range of possible concepts are reduced so they reflect a particular way of thinking. In order to reflect the postulates of the Chicago school, it appears that the social exchange school of marketing reduced the diversity of models relating to formal organizations, types of motivation, and kinds of social arrangements to the narrow set of principles discussed in the previous section. A review of the social exchange school’s original sources by the authors of this paper revealed a set of alternative principles that appeared to
have substantial potential to better conceptualize the marketing of public leisure services. These are discussed in the following sub-sections.

**Closed-system model of formal organizations**

Organizational theory literature suggests that formal organizations can be conceptualized as being closed-systems as well as open-systems. Hall summarized the major differences between these two approaches:

The closed-system model views organizations as instruments designed for the pursuit of clearly specified goals, and thus directing organizational arrangements and decisions toward goal achievement and toward making the organization more and more rational in the pursuit of its goal. The open-system model views organizations as not only concerned with goals, but also responding to external and internal pressures. In some cases the open perspective virtually ignores the issue of goals. (Hall, 1972, p. 49)

The closed-system perspective is older stemming from Weber’s classical analysis of bureaucracy. Weber (1946, p. 151) defined an organization as ‘a system of continuous purposive activity of a specified kind’, suggesting that an organization has a clear and explicit goal which determines its internal structure and the tasks which need to be undertaken to achieve this goal. Tasks are divided among members of the organization so that each member has responsibility for an area of activity that matches his/her competence.

Decision-making in a closed-system organization is based on an established normative order and is manifested by clearly specified rules and a chain of command. Selection of members is based on their skills and technical competence. Their duties and levels of remuneration are documented in a written contract (Weber, 1946).

The open-ended, or ‘natural-system’ perspective of organizations emanated from criticisms of the closed-ended system. It is based on the conventional microeconomic paradigm. Lesser emphasis is placed on an organization’s concern with goals, and greater emphasis on its responsiveness to external pressures:

The major misconception [of the closed-system model] is the failure to recognize fully that the organization is continually dependent upon inputs from the environment and that the inflow of materials and human energy is not constant. (Katz and Kahn, 1966, p. 26)

This view is based on an assumption that energy and resources are scarce and that other organizations also compete for them.

‘Coercion mutually agreed upon’

The limitation of self-interest motivation in the context of commonly held resources was formulated by Hardin (1968) in his essay *The Tragedy of the Commons*. Hardin (1968) illustrated the tragedy of the commons by using the parable of a pasture which was fixed in size, but accessible to all residents of a village. Motivated by self-interest, all the villagers sought to maximize
their own use of the pasture by grazing as many cattle on it as possible and expanding the size of their own herds. Since each villager followed the same logic, the tragedy occurred. Villagers failed to recognize that the costs of the increased grazing were shared by all villagers, so in the long term the cumulative effect of pursuing their short term independent self-interest goal harmed their collective interest. Without adequate and timely collective measures the pasture was destroyed.

The parable demonstrated that increased demand on limited resources and a philosophy of unlimited access to commonly held resources, eventually may lead to destruction of a resource. Hardin (1968) argued that education efforts to prevent the tragedy of commons are not enough, since there are likely to be ‘free riders’ who will not conform and will take advantage of others’ voluntary self-restrained actions. His suggested solution was ‘mutually agreed upon coercion’; a coercion agreed upon through democratic voting procedures by a majority of the people affected. It may take the form of a law, rule, regulation, fine, or a graduated tax. Such an approach, however, requires appointing people and agencies to be responsible for enforcing the agreed procedures: that is, bureaucrats and departments.

There is recognition that leisure resources may be subjected to recreational demands which exceed their carrying capacity and this requires a ‘mutually agreed upon coercion’ solution. For example, Cranz (1982, p. 207) noted that: ‘the public park movement has been an experiment in collective reform and expenditure. Individual experience in the parks has ultimately been a means to collective ends... Social consciousness, the opposite of selfishness, was essential to good citizenship and successful democracy’. Similarly, Leopold (1953) advocated wildlife preservation through the adoption of a self-restraint ethic which treats recreational resources as part of a community, and commonly held recreational resources as vulnerable to the tragedy of commons. Dustin et al. (1995), in this same vein, transposed Hardin’s philosophy of the tragedy of the commons into the tragedy of the recreation commons. They postulated that a worth ethic could form the ideological foundation of public leisure service delivery. The worth ethic includes respect for birthright; freedom to grow; and opportunities for choice.

These views suggest that self-interest motivation is of limited use. In many contexts it is antithetical to the philosophy of public leisure services and, hence, is inconsistent with a legitimate conceptualization of public leisure marketing. The application of self-interest motivation is integral to the social exchange school of marketing, but in the context of leisure service agencies it is inappropriate.

**Redistribution**

The relationship of formal organizations with their environments can be explained not only from an exchange perspective as suggested by the social exchange school, but also from a redistribution perspective (Polanyi, 1944; Polanyi et al., 1957; Sahlin, 1965; Dalton, 1971). Redistribution involves payment to, and disbursement by, a central political authority. It implies a hierarchically structured group and that there is a centre of the group. The
primary distinguishing feature of redistribution is sharing. Members of a group pool their resources at a centre, and this pooled or common resource is then shared among the group members according to a commonly accepted distributive rule. The tax system which underwrites many of the services of public agencies is an example of redistributive arrangements.

Insights from others

To solicit insights from others on the appropriateness of the prevailing and alternative principles for underpinning the conceptualization of leisure services marketing, a panel was assembled of eight senior leisure managers and academics who were knowledgeable about the form of leisure agencies’ organizational structures; the motives of agency personnel; and the relationships of agencies with their environments. A profile of the panel is listed in Table 1. An instrument was developed consisting of four topics, each of which offered two short scenarios or statements offering alternative perspectives relating to marketing in public leisure agencies. The statements addressed: (i) the system; (ii) the organization; (iii) interactions with the environment; and (iv) motivation of personnel.

The alternative statements were designed to represent (i) ‘wide discretion’ and ‘narrow discretion’; (ii) ‘flat organization’ and ‘hierarchical organization’ which are key differentiating features of open and closed systems; (iii) ‘voluntary exchange’ and ‘redistribution’ which are alternative arrangements for interacting with environments; and (iv) ‘self-interest’ and ‘public interest’ which are alternative motivation principles. In each of the four dichotomies, the first scenario was borrowed and adapted from the social exchange school’s principles underlying public sector marketing, while the second scenario represented an alternative principle.

The subjects were mailed the four pairs of statements in advance of a phone or personal interview. They were not informed of the theoretical principles underlying the alternative statements or the purpose of the study. The subjects were requested to preview them and give some thought to five questions associated with each set of dichotomies that constituted the framework for the subsequent interviews. In the interviews, subjects were asked to select the alternative from each pair of statements that they believed best depicted how

### Table 1. Characteristics of the panel

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent #</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Director, Park and Recreation Department (city of 50,000)</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>Academic, Department of Recreation, Parks and Tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Director, Parks and Recreation Department (city of 60,000)</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Academic, Department of Marketing</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>Academic, Department of Public Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Politician, Mayor for 8 years (city of 50,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Academic, Department of Public Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Director, Parks and Community Development (city of 400,000)</td>
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marketing was implemented in leisure agencies with which they were familiar. They were then requested to respond to the five questions which explored the rationale for their selection. This question framework was supplemented by additional probing follow-up questions. Each interview was audio-taped and lasted for between 30 and 70 minutes.

The distribution of responses was diverse, with at least one of the eight panel members supporting each of the eight alternative statements (Table 2). Some subjects indicated no clear preference for some alternatives. For example, in the organization topic area, three subjects believed that both the flat and the hierarchical perspectives could be valid. For example, Respondent 1 stated, ‘We have some top-down and some crossways relationships. At the mission level it is hierarchical, but at the operational level it is flat and decentralized’. Similar ambivalence to the two alternatives was observed in the motivation of personnel topic area where two of the panel were reluctant to select an option: ‘I think it can be both. There is some balance between self-interest and public service orientation’ (Respondent 3).

Most consensus emerged on topic III, interaction with the environment, where six of the panel members believed that a public leisure agency’s interactions with the environment are based primarily on the notion of redistribution. Respondent 4 commented, ‘Most funding for public agencies comes from redistribution, but a few services like golf can be provided based on exchange’. Most subjects noted that securing resources through tax payments is not a voluntary activity and ‘if you let people voluntarily decide to pay or not to pay taxes, most would probably choose not to pay. But they would still expect the free services’.

A key feature of the social exchange school’s concept of marketing is that a bureaucracy is an inefficient and unresponsive machine (Kotler, 1975a). However, several members of this panel believed that bureaucrats as public servants are not supposed to be responsive to, or efficiently satisfy, individual needs. Respondent 6, who was a public administration scholar but also had eight years experience as a city mayor, stated:

People want effective government, but we want it to be responsive when we approach government individually and in some cases that would mean violating the common rules. When a person comes to city hall and demands extra garbage pick up and wants the council to establish a new rule or schedule for pick-ups, we cannot deal with his/her specific problem because there are common rules and schedules which have been designed to meet everyone’s needs. A person does not
understand that bureaucracy tends to be unresponsive to individual needs. It is concerned with administering a commonly established rule that says we have a specific time to pick up that person’s garbage during the week. The rule is designed so it is the most efficient way to serve everybody. People want productive and efficient government that runs by the rules, except when it comes to them.

The social exchange school’s conceptualization of marketing regarded self-interest motivation as being self-evident and excluded it from discussion because it ‘was taken for granted’ (Shapiro, 1973). In contrast, the majority view of the eight panel members was that public service interest was the dominant motivation of agency personnel, not self-interest (table 1).

Although there was general agreement with Dixon’s (1978) criticism of the social exchange school that public agencies’ actions are constrained by being part of a larger system, the panel members believed agency managers are given reasonably wide discretion to achieve their goals. Nevertheless, they recognized they are part of a larger hierarchical government structure which in some cases defines the mission for the organization relatively narrowly. Thus, Respondent 5 commented:

Most public agencies tend to operate with narrow discretion rather than wide discretion, simply because of the nature of the law. It describes the goal, but does not give you a lot of leeway in how to reach it.

However, Respondent 6 suggested that the amount of discretion was usually quite broad:

A park and recreation department usually has wide discretion to make proposals and the city council as a rule approves them. Wide discretion to me means that you give them resources and money, and let them decide what programmes to deliver and how to carry them out. The council still has to approve the money and the fee structure, but it gives the department wide discretion on how to administer the programmes.

The interviews revealed a lack of broad support for the key principles underlying the social exchange school’s conceptualization of marketing. Four valuable insights emerged. First, bureaucracy is not supposed to be responsive and efficient toward individual needs. Rather, it is supposed to be responsive and efficient toward collective needs. Second, a public leisure agency is not an independent entity with an independently defined mission, but is part of a larger government structure that often narrowly defines the agency’s range of activities and tightly defines its mission. An agency may have some operational discretion, but its actions generally must be directed towards achieving a narrowly predetermined mission. Third, the dominant interaction mechanism with a public agency’s environment is redistribution through taxation, rather than voluntary exchange. Fourth, the major ethical basis on which leisure agency employees make decisions is the public interest, not self-interest.
Revised conceptualization of marketing in the context of public leisure services

The revised conceptualization suggested here rests on three principles: redistribution; the features of a closed-system organization; and public interest motivation.

Redistribution principle

Aggregate annual investments by federal, state, and municipal levels of government in the US for public park and recreation services approach $20 billion, but as Von Mises (1944, p. 84) ironically observed, ‘The truth is that the government cannot give if it does not take from somebody’. The collection of taxes and their disbursement in the form of public services involves redistribution.

Dalton (1971) defines redistribution as the obligatory payment of money to a central political authority which uses the receipts for its own maintenance, to provide community services, and as an emergency reserve in case there is a community disaster. Thus, in the context of leisure services, redistribution involves the obligatory payment of property and sales taxes to local and state governments, and income taxes to state and federal governments, which redistribute portions of what they receive to provide leisure services for the community.

Market exchange and reciprocity arrangements are between two or more parties but a redistribution system reflects a within and collective action of a group (Sahlins, 1965). The group is hierarchically structured with a commonly recognized leadership and a clearly defined membership which pools resources. Once resources have been collected into a jurisdiction’s general fund, the central authority is confronted with the primary question of redistribution which is: ‘who gets what, when, and how’.

Thus, redistribution involves two relatively independent steps. First, the collection of taxes from bottom to top. Second, the delivery of services from top to bottom. A consequence of this conceptualization is that the quid pro quo notion of dyadic exchange is replaced by the notions of redistributive justice and equity. The role of government as the central political authority is dominant and the leisure services agency assumes a place and role within the larger redistribution system.

Voluntary exchange conceptualizes a public leisure agency as being at the centre of the universe, with the central government and all other publics (user groups, other government departments, media, business community, general public, federal and state agencies, private sector competitors, etc.) are viewed as satellites rotating around it. The agency is viewed as the unconstrained initiator of marketing exchange transactions with all of these publics.

In contrast, the redistributive conceptualization views a public leisure agency as a subsystem of the larger redistribution system which is controlled by a jurisdiction’s central governing body. From this perspective, the central governing body is the centre of the universe and the public leisure agency is one of many satellites rotating around it (Dixon, 1978).
Closed-system

The usefulness of the services of profit-seeking organizations is determined by customers’ willingness to pay the price asked for them. If they are willing to pay, then the output of such services increases until saturation of the market is reached, at which point the factors of production will shift towards other services that are in greater demand. The profit motive and price structure of the market serve as a sensitive compass to commercial organizations indicating the appropriate amount of services to produce, and guiding decisions as to the services in which money should be invested. Under these circumstances, the management of profit seeking organizations tends to be flexible, discrete, and decentralized, because anything that may retard a business’ ability to adapt to changing customer preferences may be fatal to its continued viability. It is not managers who lay off employees and dissolve businesses, it is the disapproval of its customers which results in an excess of costs over revenues that leads to such actions.

In the case of public leisure agencies, the mechanics of viability are quite different. Managers are allocated a fixed amount through the budget setting process for a specific purpose, so their primary concern is not with residents’ willingness to pay or with generating a surplus of revenues over costs. Since profit or loss is not considered the criterion of management’s success or failure, the only means to make managers responsible to the central-elected legislative body is to limit their discretion by giving them carefully proscribed performance measures that assess their effectiveness in achieving the legislative body’s social goals. The strong budget control, narrowly defined role, and tight proscription of actions through performance measures are the characteristics of a closed-system.

The rules, regulations and performance measures governing leisure service agencies will vary, but it is important to distinguish between those appropriate to an agency’s ‘core area of mission’, which relates to the central social goals that proscribe the agency’s activities; and those appropriate to its ‘extant mission’, which relates to its more entrepreneurial activities (Capon and Mauser, 1982).

A core area of mission is usually associated with those services that are financed directly and fully from the general fund. An extant mission relates to programs and services that are self-sufficient, or at least partially paid for directly by participants. A core area of mission, e.g. to provide urban park opportunities, is unlikely to change without significant political shifts. However, the extant mission can change frequently as an agency’s managers seek to adapt to a community’s changing recreation needs, provided that the city council approves the changes.

Public interest principle

Like commercial organizations, governments hire employees as factors of production to deliver services. However, the underlying, driving motive of personnel in profit-seeking organizations is different from those working in public agencies. The self-interest of those in profit-oriented businesses is
replaced by the public interest motive of those employed in public agencies. Thus, the first item addressed in the American Society for Public Administration’s Code of Ethics is, ‘Serve the public interest’, which encourages public employees to ‘serve the public beyond serving oneself’ (Van Wart, 1996).

Revised definition

Based on the previous analysis, the following definition of public leisure services marketing is offered:

Public leisure services marketing is the analysis, planning, implementation and evaluation of leisure programmes, designed to facilitate redistributive arrangements within a community that were established by a central governing body. It relies heavily upon designing leisure services that reflect a community’s leisure needs; adopting approved (by government) prices, communication mechanisms and quality standards; and personnel who are committed to meeting the leisure needs of the community.

This definition suggests that the task of leisure managers is to accept the mission and objectives set by central government (e.g. city council and city manager’s office) and operate within the parameters and priorities they delineate to: ascertain residents’ recreational needs and wants; evaluate the opportunities and constraints associated with alternative actions in terms of their contribution to the public interest as defined by central government; and explore alternative sources of resources and alternative delivery mechanisms for bringing the preferred actions to fruition.

This definition is designed to guide the marketing of an agency’s core services. The phrase ‘facilitate redistributive arrangements’ may need to be omitted or amended for those facets of the extant mission where no general tax funds are involved. For example, in some US communities, golf courses are operated out of enterprise funds. This means the primary mandate is to ensure that all capital, operating and overhead costs associated with golf are met by revenues accruing from users.

To characterize marketing in the context of public leisure services and to distinguish it from the traditional ‘exchange based marketing’ which accurately conceptualizes marketing in the for-profit sector, it may be appropriate to adopt the term ‘administered marketing’. The historical root of administered marketing is administered trade. Under administered trade ‘prices, as well as all other terms, had been negotiated with the king before any transactions could take place’ (Arnold, 1957, p. 168). Historical records document that under the system of administered trade the king ‘fixes the price of every sort’. After ‘the terms were agreed upon and the King’s customs paid’ the merchant had ‘full liberty to trade, which is proclaimed throughout the country by the King’s cryer’ (Arnold, 1947, p. 168). These eighteenth century rules seem to aptly reflect the central control exercised by local governments on the actions of their leisure agencies.
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